

Research Article

Nature and Aspects of Gender Integration During Election Violence in Kibera Slum, Kenya

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Abstract:

Election violence has the potential to threaten the peace and security of many nations and destabilize the social fabric. Scholars have argued that women and children bear the greatest burden in times of violence compared to men. The main purpose of this study was to assess the nature and aspects of gender integration during election violence in Kibera slum, Kenya. The study was guided by social integration theory by Emille Durkheim and employed the descriptive research design. Fischer formulae as suggested was used to arrive at the sample size of 384 respondents;

$S = \frac{X^2 NP (1-P)}{d^2 (N-1) + X^2 P (1-P)}$. Data were collected by use of interviewee assisted questionnaires and unstructured interview schedules. Data were analyzed by use of the statistical packages for social scientists (SPSS version 17). Data were presented in form of frequency tables, bar graphs, pie charts and verbatims, Measures of data analysis used included the chi square, mean, R spearman's rank order correlation. The study established that Kibera residents had a moderately cordial relationship with each other during election violence. Majority could seek help or be helped, buy property or land, marry or be married and employ or be employed by someone outside their ethnic, social class political and religious affiliations. Election violence had a negative relationship with ethnic affiliations, social class, political affiliation and religious affiliation aspects of gender integration, that is, an increase in election violence would lead to a decrease in gender integration. Generally, women were more integrated compared to men. The study recommends that NGOs, CBOs and FBOs enhance their non-partisan advocacy and carry out civic education to enlighten Kibera residents and Kenyans at large on the importance of gender integration especially during the elections.

Key words: Gender integration, Gender relations, Election violence, Kibera slum

1.0 Introduction

Gender being the social construction of being a man or woman is an important organizing variable in society (Koster et al, 2016., Hamasi, 2015., Nillison & Young, 2007 & Collins & Yieke, 2006). Traditionally gender roles were highly differentiated although this has changed overtime partly due to women emancipation for gender equality. Through performance of gender roles, men and women are in constant relations with each other and it is expected that their interaction is cohesive to avoid social dysfunction. Although no specific literature is available on gender integration, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) act, no. 8 of 2008 provides some insights into the nature and aspects of gender integration in Kenya. The act postulates that social cohesion and integration should provide an affective bond and

feelings of solidarity between Kenyans. It emphasizes on multiculturalism which offers a footstall for national development and peaceful coexistence (NCIC, 2008).

The NCIC act also outlines some attributes used to evaluate the level of cohesion and integration among Kenyan communities who are of different socio-economic backgrounds, ethnic constitution, political and religious affiliations. These are prosperity, equity, diversity, trust, inclusion and interdependence. Prosperity is defined as the capacity of the Kenyan society to ensure the wellbeing of all members in order to minimize the disparities between the rich and the poor. Unfortunately, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening every year (Kenya Economic Survey, 2020). This coupled with other social evils such as corruption, high crime rates and

unemployment has pulled Kenyans apart thus hindering social cohesion and integration. To achieve equity, the UNESCO gender mainstreaming framework outlines measures to be put in place by countries to achieve equal conditions and treatment for both men and women in realizing their full potential and full human rights (UNESCO, 2015). In addition, the 2010 constitution and the vision 2030 policy framework endeavors for realization of full participation of both men and women particularly in the political, economic and educational sectors (Mwaniki, 2014). However, traditional and cultural practices, high poverty levels, unequal political representation and diseases remain a hinderance to this achievement.

In terms of diversity, Kenya as a country boasts of people of different ethnic, political and religious affiliations. Nonetheless, these diversities can act as a source of conflict or a unifying factor depending on how each group view those outside their group identity. According to Chelanga, Ndege and Singo as quoted in Matanga, Bradshaw and Muhindi (2012), Kenyans; see themselves through their identity cocoon first before their national tag. The scholars are of the view that ethnicity constitutes an integral part of political, economic and social lives of Kenyans. Different communities in Kenya share a common history and this enhances their sense of belongingness. Nevertheless, by the virtue that Kenya is made up of different communities, this sense of belongingness has played a role in dividing rather than uniting them. For example, Kenyans diverse ethnicity rears its ugly head during elections. According to Gikonyo (2011), Kenya as a multi-ethnic country has adopted an ethicized political party system. Political leaders organize their followers along ethnic lines to clinch to or retain power for their own benefit. In the process Kenyans turn against each other during the electoral process.

In terms of trust, literature reviewed showed that Kenyans trust levels are highly differentiated along diverse groups and social classes. Trust was a very important attribute in the analysis of social integration. A study by King'oro and Nasimiyu (2018), gives an insight into the levels of trust among different groups in the Kenyan society which included family members, neighbors, and different ethnicities, racial, economic and religious groups. Among different religious groups the levels of trust were exceedingly high for majority of the respondents. The levels of trust were even higher among family's members at 96%. However, the

levels of trust went down among different races at only 17%. Women had higher trust levels as compared to men at 37% and 35 % respectively. Of great concern is that the study found out that Kenyans were less optimistic of relations between different socio-economic groups at 16%. Elsewhere, Braton and Kaimenyi, (2008), note that Kenyans downplay ethnicity when portraying themselves but do not trust those outside their own ethnicity in matters political leadership.

Trust was ranked very highly during the 1995 world summit on social development in Copenhagen. It is the glue that binds the society together. According to Green *et al.*, (2011), trust and reciprocity enable collective action and bonds within communities.

In terms, of inclusion, the Kenya constitution outlines non-discrimination of all persons regardless of their race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth (Kenya Constitution, 2010). However, this sounds more of rhetoric as opposed to reality. For example, according to the Kenya Economic Report (KER), poverty levels remain high and particularly among the rural poor as compared to their urban counterparts (KER,2020). In addition. Kenya's political landscape is highly dominated by men and women have to work twice as hard to be elected in parliament (Anyango et al,2018).

In terms of interdependence, the Kenyan population are highly dependent on each other. This is often pronounced through self-help groups whereby members come together to uplift each other's economic statuses (Chitere,2018). Social networks are also very handy when one has lost a loved one and acquaintances pull their resources together to give the departed a befitting send of. This can be an uphill task if the bereaved do not have a well-integrated social network. The same is articulated when one needs a helping hand during weddings, education of children or in time of sickness. Most often, these networks are within one's social class and rarely cut across the social -economic divide unless for mutual coexistence. These social networks are usually affected by election violence that has been witnessed in Kenya since the onset of multi party politics. For example, Wamwere (2008), in his analysis of the 2007/8 post-election violence (PEV), posits that Kenyans lack of a sense of nationhood and a pronounced ethnic base act as catalyst for violence during elections.

It was therefore paramount to assess the nature and aspects of gender integration during election violence in Kibera slum, Kenya. Kibera slum is the largest slum in Kenya and second largest in Africa after Soweto slum in South Africa. The slum is highly integrated with men and women from different communities and backgrounds residing side by side with each other. However, this integration is often threatened by recurrence of violence during each electioneering period.

2.0 Theoretical Framework

The study was guided by Durkheim's theory of social solidarity as presented in his classic work; "the division of labor in society" (1984) 1997 translated in his original book; *de la division du travail social* (1893). According to Durkheim, social solidarity is the common consciousness that ties the individual to the society to bring social order (Durkheim, 1984). Durkheim argues that all societies exhibit some form and degree of social (group) solidarity. He identifies two types of solidarity; mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity is found in archaic and/ or segmentary societies which is homogeneous and undifferentiated and common sharing precede communal activities such as child rearing, farm work, religious and cultural events. Thus, mechanical solidarity emphasizes unity and agreement as opposed to conflict and disagreements. The traditional African society was a mechanical solidarity society as people were bound together by social norms and values which were highly regarded (Giddens, 1971). Those who went against the social norms were highly punished and this served as a deterrence for similar actions in future. This changed with the colonization of the African continent. On the other hand, in organic solidarity, collective consciousness begins to decline as collective consciousness is disturbed and individuals no longer have common experiences. With the colonization of Kenya by the British, the old ways of doing things and the social organization of different communities were disrupted. This coupled with modernity and the global phenomenon witnessed in the 21st Century have tremendously changed Kenyan communities and their ways of doing things. The modern Kenyan society is far from being closely knit and instead it is characterized by individualism which is a product of capitalism mode of production, lawlessness and social strife due to unequal power relations as observed in Organic solidarity. Such is typical of

the modern societies and Kibera slum residents are not an exemption. Thus, this theory was appropriate to understand the nature and aspects of gender integration during EV in Kibera slum.

3.0 Methodology

This study made use of the descriptive research design which is ideal for gathering opinions, feelings and understanding of a particular social phenomenon Mugenda & Mugenda (2008). The study made use of quantitative and qualitative approaches of data collection and analysis. Structured interview schedules (interviewer assisted questionnaires) with open and closed ended questions were used to collect quantitative data whereas unstructured interview schedules were used to collect qualitative data.

The study was conducted in Kibera Slum. According to the Kenya National population and Housing Census (KNPHC) (2009), Kibera slum forms the Kibera division which is one of the three divisions that constitute the Nairobi West Sub-County of Nairobi City County, Kenya. Kibera slum lies 1° 19' 0" South and 36° 47' 0" East of the equator and is made up of nine sub divisions or locations which are; Gatwikira, Kibera, Kianda, Lindi, Makina, Mugumoini, Siranga, Serang'ombe and Laini Saba. Therefore, for the purposes of this study Kibera slum was synonymous to Kibera division.

The study population consisted of the following categories of respondents; heads of the households, security officers, chiefs/sub chiefs, sub county officers, village elders, youth leaders, managers of NGOs and CBOs, primary and secondary school heads and religious leaders

The study adopted proportionate stratified random sampling technique to collect quantitative data. Since the total number of households for Kibera slum was more than ten thousands (10,000) households, using 121,933 households as the parameters, the following social science research formulae was used to arrive at the sample size as suggested by Fischer in Mugenda & Abel (2003) and Krejcie and Morgan (1997) to determine the sample size of 384. households as follows:

$$S = \frac{X^2 NP (1-P)}{d^2 (N-1) + X^2 P (1-P)}$$

S= Required sample size

X^2 = Chi Square Value at 1 degree of freedom (3.841)

N = Population Size

P = Population proportion with desired characteristics (assumed to be 0.5)

d = Degree of accuracy as a proportion (0.50)

$$\text{Sample Size Calculation} = \frac{3.841 * 121,933 * .50(1-.50)}{(.052(2,750-1)+3.841 * .50(1.50))} = 384 \text{ households}$$

An interviewee assisted questionnaire was used to collect primary data. The main method of data collection was structured interviewing. Two sets of interview guides were used to collect qualitative data, one for in-depth interviews and the second for focus group discussions (FGDs). Secondary data collection was an ongoing process. It was obtained by reviewing relevant journals, text books, government/ nongovernmental documents/ reports and on-line sources. Data were presented in form of percentages and frequency tables.

4.0 Study Findings And Discussions

4.1.1 Gender of the household heads in Kibera Slum, Kenya

The researcher observed the respondents' gender. The summary of their gender distribution is as shown in Figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1: Gender of Sampled Household Respondents

Source: Field data (2019)

As shown in Figure 4.1, most of the respondents in Kibera slum were men; 52.0% (198) in Kibera and 48% (186) were women. A Chi-square test conducted on gender showed that there was significant variation in the gender of the respondents in Kibera slum, $X^2(8) = 159.00$, $p=0.000$. Though there was a variation in terms of

gender, the opinions from the respondents on gender integration during election violence were considered to reflect the responses from the entire population in Kibera slum. Gender was an important variable in the study since most of the perpetrators of election violence are usually men (The Waki report, 2008 & Mcgee,2003).

These findings are in concurrence with those of Wamalwa *et al.*, (2016) who found that men were majority in Kibera slum although women constituted more than 40% (183) of the respondents in Kibera slum.

4.1.2 Age of the household heads in Kibera Slum, Kenya

Respondents were asked about their age range. The results are as shown in Table 4,1

Table 4.1: Age of the Respondents years
Source: Field data (2019)

N=384	Frequency	Percent
18-19	27	7.0
20-29	124	32.2
30-39	105	27.4
40-49	79	20.6
50-59	25	6.5
Over 60	24	6.0

Most of the respondents were aged between 20-29 years; 32.2% (124); 30-39 years were 27.4% (124) and 40 and 49 years were 20.6% (79). Other notable age groups were 50 and 59 years comprising 6.5% (25), 18 and 19 years, 7.0% (27) and over 60 years, 6.0% (24). Chi-square test conducted on age distribution showed there was significant variation in the age of respondents in Kibera slum ($\chi^2_{5,0.01} 158.750$). Most of the respondents were between 20 and 39, the youthful age who are active perpetrators of election violence. These results are confirmed by those of Syombua (2014) who found that most of the respondents in Kibera slum are between 20 and 40 years old. This age group is less likely to be integrated compared to the aged population.

4.1.3 Educational level of the respondents of Kibera Slum, Kenya

Respondents were also analyzed according to their educational qualifications. The results were as presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Educational Level of the Respondents

N=384	Frequency	Percent
Secondary	171	44.5
Primary	101	26.3
College	70	18.2
Non formal education	32	8.3
University	10	2.6

Source: Field data (2019)

Majority of the respondents had attained secondary education 44.5% (171) followed by primary education 26.3% (101), college 18.2% (70), none formal education 8.3% (32) and university education 2.6% (10). Those with college and graduate education formed a very small percentage. Whereas majority had secondary education and below. This is a significant finding as it shows that with limited education, chances of getting formal employment are few and this explains why most people in Kibera slum are engaged in informal work. Chi-Square value ($\chi^2_{4,0.01} 210.303$) showed that there was highly significant ($p < 0.01$) variation in the distribution of the level of education of respondents.

The UN report (2007), note that many residents of Kibera slum are engaged in informal employment and work as domestic helps, *mama mbogas* (vegetable vendors), charcoal sellers or unskilled workers in construction sites and export processing zones (EPZs) and live below the poverty line with an income of approximately \$ 1.25 a day. This class of people tend to have simplistic way of life which constitute informal relations and therefore more integration.

4.1.4 Ethnic affiliation of the respondents in Kibera slum, Kenya

The study sought to establish the ethnic affiliation of the households’ respondents in Kibera division. The results are as shown in Figure 4.3.

Table 4.3: Ethnic Affiliation of the Respondents

N=384	Frequency	Percent
Luo	96	25.0
Luhya	83	21.6
Kikuyu	67	17.4
Kamba	67	17.4
Nubian	29	7.6
Kisii	29	7.6
Taita	2	0.5

Source: Field data (2019)

Respondents were further analysed based on their ethnic affiliation. A quarter (1/4), that is, 25.0% (96) of the respondents residing in Kibera division were from the Luo ethnic community, 21.6% (83) were from the Luhya ethnic group while those from the kikuyu and Kamba ethnic groups were 17.4% (67). Other notable communities’ ethnic groupings were the Nubian ethnic group 7.6% (29), the Kisii ethnic group 7.6% (29) and the Taita ethnic group 0.5% (2). From the findings, the presence of more than five ethnic groups in Kibera slum showed that Kibera slum is multi- ethnic. Kenya’s ethnic affiliation is often a source of their division particularly during elections

4.2 Nature and Aspects of Gender Integration

Data were gathered on the nature and aspects of gender integration in Kibera slum. On the nature of gender integration, the study analysed the type of the relationship that the Kibera residents had with each other and if this relationship was affected by election violence. On the aspects of gender integration, the study sought to find out if the respondents would seek help or help, purchase land or property, marry or be married and employ or be employed by someone outside their ethnic affiliation, social class, political affiliation and religious affiliation. To establish the level of gender integration among Kibera residents, the study employed independent sample t-test where significant p value indicates that there is absence of gender integration while insignificant p value postulates that gender integration had been achieved. The study further applied Spearman Correlation to establish the relationship between election violence and gender integration using R Coefficient. Lastly, the study used linear regression to determine the contribution of election violence on gender integration and to achieve the study’s objective. The percentage change as determined by R Square was used to explain variance in gender integration as a result of election violence.

4.2.1 Nature of Gender Integration in Kibera Slum

The respondents were asked to describe the relationship that they have with other people in Kibera slum during election violence. The results are as shown in Figure 4.2




Figure 4. 2 Nature of Respondents' Relationship with other residents of Kibera Slum

Source: Field data (2019)

More men 64.3% (127) than women 35.7% (66) had a rarely cordial relationship with other residents in Kibera slum. Similarly, the same results were obtained in regard to cordial relationship whereby more men 58.5% (116) had cordial relationship with other residents in Kibera slum as compared to women 41.5% (77). However, slightly more women 51.4% (96) than men 48.6% (99) had moderate cordial relationship with other residents in Kibera slum. Similarly, more women 69.4% (129) had very cordial relationship with other residents in Kibera slum as compared to men 30.6% (61). A Pearson Chi-Square indicated that there was significant association between gender of the sampled household respondents and relationship with other residents in Kibera slum during election violence as indicated by $X^2(3) = 10.951, p=0.012$.

Cumulatively, only 4.2% (16) of the sampled household respondents indicated that their relationship with other residents in Kibera slum was rarely cordial, 43.2% (166) indicated that the relationship with other residents in Kibera slum was cordial, 46.1% (117) indicated it was moderately cordial and 6.5% (25) indicated it was very cordial. The study computed the mean and established that generally, there was moderate cordial relationship amongst residents of Kibera slum as indicated by a mean of 2.5.

The results show that women integrate better than men during election violence. Studies on social relations between genders indicate that even in normal times, women have greater social relations as compared to men. For example, a study by

Antonucci, Lansford and Hiroko (2002), examined differences between men and women in social relations and resource deficits in four countries across the globe namely; France, Germany, Japan and USA. Although the study indicated few differences in quantity and quality of social relations between men and women, the later were more likely to experience illness and financial strains when in less satisfying social relations. In their study of how gender affects patterns of social relations, Fuhrer and Stanfield (2002), found out that women reported more close persons in their primary networks as opposed to men and were less likely to nominate their spouses as their closest persons. The study found out that social relations had a direct and positive impact on one's morbidity and even mortality.

4.2.1.1 Gender and Kibera Slum Residents Relations with Each Other

The study sought to establish gender differences in regard to the relationship that respondents had with the residents of Kibera slum

Table 4.4: Men and women in regard to their relationship with other residents of Kibera slum

Group	N	Mean	T	Df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
Male	198	2.687	-3.765	38	.000	-.4153
Female	186	3.102		2		

Source: Field data (2019)

Table 4.4 shows that there was significant difference between men and women in regard to their relationship with other residents in Kibera slum during election violence as indicated by $t(382) = -3.765, p=0.000$. This implies that women had more (M. D=-0.4153) moderate cordial relationship as compared to men with the residents of Kibera slum. The results from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews revealed that a great number of women had reached out to each other with an aim of living cordially during election violence. She however was not aware of such an initiative by her male counterparts including her husband. These results agree with those of Bennett, Chepngeno-Langat, Evandrou and Falkingham (2015) who revealed that women exhibited fairly friendly relationship with other people after election violence as compared to men in Kibera and Kawangware slum.

4.2.1.2 Effects of Election Violence on Gender

Relations in Kibera Slum

The respondents were asked to indicate whether the relationship they had with Kibera residents was affected by election violence. The results are shown on Table 4.3




Figure 4.3: Effects of Election violence on the Respondents’ relationship with other residents of Kibera slum

Source: Field data (2019)

Slightly, less than half of the respondents 47.7% (183) confirmed that their relationship was affected by election violence while 29.9% (115) did not associate their relationship with election violence and 22.4% (86) were not sure whether their relationship with other residents in Kibera slum was affected by election violence.

The respondents who were in agreement that their relationship with other residents of Kibera slum was affected by election violence were further asked to indicate the ways in which this relationship was affected. The results are as shown in table 4.5

Table 4.5: Ways in which election violence affected the respondent’s relationship with other residents of Kibera slum

N= 183	Frequency	Percentage
Ethnic affiliation	66	36.07
Mistrust	56	30.60
Political affiliation	45	24.60
Hatred	32	17.49
Fear	18	9.84

Source: Field data (2019)

Approximately 36.1% (66) affirmed that their relationship was affected by ethnic affiliation, 30.6% (56) was affected by mistrust, 24.6% (45) by political affiliation, 17.5% (32) by hatred and 9.8% (18) by fear.

KII results revealed that ethnic affiliation was used as a tool during elections to cause violence. One of the Key respondents said

One’s ethnic affiliation is important as it dictates if one will be recruited into the youth wing for demonstration. You must be ethnically right to be trusted. Otherwise if your ethnicity is not in support of *baba* (the ODM leader in 2007 and 2017 general elections), it is not possible for you to support our course and therefore we cannot recruit you. (In-depth Interview with Youth leader in Gatwikira Location, 2019).

This shows the extent to which ethnicity has been entrenched in Kenya’s politics heightening the levels of gender disintegration. During FGDs one of the participant noted:

We no longer relate the way we used to relate before the elections as we lost trust in each other. Perhaps due to atrocities committed to us during election violence. Some people are usually used by politicians to cause violence. At the end, we all suffer. You cannot trust anyone here. Even your friend or immediate neighbor can turn against you. You cannot know who betrayed you. For me I just keep my preferred candidate to myself. I weigh the days preceding elections and if my instincts tell me to leave, I do without looking back. I travel upcountry where I feel safe and come back later. (FGD Participant in Silanga Location, 2019).

FGDs with respondents affirmed the extent to which Political affiliation affected gender integration. One of the participants said:

Heightened political temperature brings about tensions among the political party divides. For example, during the 2017 general elections those who were in support of the government and president’s Uhuru presidential candidature could not see eye to eye with those in support of *Baba*, that is, the ODM presidential candidate. Whenever, they met, there was confrontation. This escalated after the announcements of 2017 presidential results and this highly

contributed to the violence experience in Kibera slum. However, the handshake has brought peace but still people are some people still hold grudges on what happened. (FGD Participant in Serang’ombe Location, 2019).

Other participants identified fear of election violence as a contributor to gender disintegration.

Post-election violence has made it difficult for people to relate as before, that is the time most of us knew your neighbor can turn into a beast because you don’t belong to his/her ethnic group. Going forward I have remained skeptical about my neighbors. (FGD Participant in Silanga Location, 2019).

The study further conducted inferential statistics to establish the association between election violence and the resident’s relationship with each other in Kibera slum. Using Pearson Chi-Square of association, the results indicated that there was significant association between election violence and interpersonal relationship as indicated by $X^2(6) = 85.503, p=0.000$. Further, the study found out that there was no significant difference between men and women in regard to relationship with other residents in Kibera slum as indicated by $t(382) = -.509, p=0.611$. This implies that both men and women had similar perception on the effect of election violence on their relationship with other residents in Kibera slum. The insignificant mean difference of -0.0415 implies that both men and women confirmed that election violence affected their relationship. These findings are confirmed by those of Mumo (2014), who found that the 2007/8 PEV in Kibera slum had shattered friendships the residents had with each other immensely.

4.3 Aspects of Gender Integration in Kibera Slum

To find out the aspects of gender integration in Kibera slum, the sampled household respondents were asked if they could seek help or help, buy land or property, marry or be married and employ or be employed by someone outside their ethnic affiliation, social class, political affiliation or religious affiliation. The results are as follows;

4.3.1 Ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration

The sampled household respondents were asked to indicate their opinion in regard to seeking help or helping, purchasing land and/or property, being

married or marrying being married and being employed or employing someone outside **their ethnic affiliation. The results are as shown in Table 4.6**

Table 4.6: Ethnic Affiliation Aspect of Gender Integration

N=384	Yes	No	Not Sure	Mean
Seek Help/ Help	90.6% (348)	6.3% (24)	3.1% (12)	1.125
Purchase land/pr operty	52.1% (200)	33.6% (129)	14.3% (55)	1.622
Marry/ Be marrie d	71.4% (274)	20.8% (80)	7.8% (30)	1.365
Emplo y/Be emplo yed	89.6% (344)	4.7% (18)	5.7% (22)	1.161

Two Sample T-Test						
	Mal e	Fem ale	T	Df	Sig.	M.D
Seek Help/ Help	1.111	1.140	-.676	382	.499	-.0287
Purchase land/pr operty	1.636	1.608	.390	382	.697	.0288
Marry/ Be marrie d	1.444	1.870	2.631	382	.009	.1649
Emplo y/Be emplo yed	1.207	1.113		382	.062	.0942

Source: Field data (2019)

Majority, 90.6 % (348) of the sampled household respondents affirmed that they can seek help or help someone outside their ethnic affiliation, 6.3 % (24) indicated they cannot seek help or help someone outside their ethnic affiliation and 3.1% (12) were not sure. A mean of 1.125 postulated that most of the respondents confirmed that they can seek help or help someone outside their ethnic affiliation. To examine the extent of gender integration by ethnic affiliation, an independent t-test was conducted. On the comparison between men and women, the results revealed there was no significant ($p=0.499$) difference between the two genders in seeking help or helping someone outside their ethnic affiliation. The results also revealed that a slight majority, 52.1 % (200) of the respondents could purchase land or

property outside their ethnic affiliation, 33.6% (129) of the sampled said they cannot purchase land or property from someone outside their ethnic affiliation and 14.3 % (55) were not sure. A mean of 1.622 implies that most of the respondents confirmed that they can purchase land/property from someone outside their ethnic affiliation. The findings indicated that there was no significant ($p=0.697$) difference between the genders implying that both men and women in purchase land or property from a person outside one's ethnic group. Majority, 71.4% (274) of the sampled household respondents said they can marry or be married by someone outside their ethnic affiliation, 20.8% (80) indicated they cannot marry or be married by someone outside their ethnic affiliation and 7.8% (30) were not sure. A mean of 1.365 indicates that most of the respondents confirmed that they can marry or be married by someone outside their ethnic affiliation. On the comparison between men and women, the results revealed that there was significant difference between the genders $t(382) = 2.631, p=0.009$ implying that men ($M=1.444$) were less likely to marry or be married to a person outside their ethnic affiliation as compared to women respondents ($M=1.280$).

The results also revealed that majority, 89.6% (344) of the respondent were in agreement could employ or employed by someone outside their ethnic affiliation, 4.7% (18) said they cannot employ or be employed from someone outside their ethnic affiliation and 5.7% (22) were not sure. A mean of 1.61 implies that most of the respondents confirmed that they can employ or be employed by someone outside their ethnic affiliation. On the contrast between men and women, the findings indicated there was no significant ($p=0.062$) difference between the genders implying that both men and women confirmed that they can employ or be employed by someone outside their ethnic affiliation.

Results from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews revealed that ethnic affiliation affected gender integration in Kibera slum. Some FGD participants acknowledged that they difficult in seeking help or helping someone outside their ethnic groupings.

I remember a time I had no food in my house and I approached the mama mboga for some vegetables on credit to pay later. She frankly told me that she cannot give me kales (Sukuma wiki) on credit since

my people are known not to pay especially this time of elections. I was very disappointed since I have always purchased vegetables in her kiosk. If this was the case, I would have gone to my people to buy Sukuma Wiki there. (FGD Participant in Silanga Location, 2019).

During electioneering period the residents of Kibera slum congregate within tribal cocoons as the politics of the country are tribal based. During this time the residents rally behind their tribal candidate and see those not of their ethnic affiliation as outsiders and traitors of their course. This is an indication of how ethnicity takes center stage in everything during elections. This results to ethnic profiling which has no basis eventually affecting the relationship that the residents of Kibera slum have with each other. Another FGD participant had a similar experience during the electioneering period.

While I was looking for a room in Makina, most of the land lords and ladies asked about my ethnicity before considering my inquiry. Some of them explicitly mentioned three or two tribes that should not be offered space. Therefore, it took a lot of time before I finally found a room and they charged me very expensive as compared to other tenants. (FGD Participant in Makina Location, 2019).

These findings are supported by those of King'oro and Gitire (2018) whose survey on the extent of trust on other groups such as family and ethnicity found out that 86% of the respondent either trusted completely or trusted somewhat people of a different ethnic group. According to Gachanga (2017) negative ethnicity was a challenge to gender integration among other factors such as land disputes, distribution of economic resources and corruption. In terms of ethnicity and election violence, some studies have linked ethnic affiliation to election violence atrocities. For example, Holmes (2013) revealed that atrocities committed during elections such as rape and killings had an ethnic bearing. Citing the 2007/8 PEV in Kenya, the scholar noted that those who committed these heinous acts, did so to people perceived to belong to their opponent's ethnic affiliation.

4.3.2 Social class aspect of gender integration

The sampled household respondents were asked to indicate their opinion in regard to seeking help or helping, purchasing land and/or property, being married or marrying marriage and being employed or employing someone outside their social class. The results are as shown in Table 4.7

Table 4.7: Social Class Aspect of Gender Integration

N=384	Yes	No	Not Sure	Mean		
Seek Help/Helping	97.4 % (374)	1.6% (6)	1% (4)	1.036		
Purchase land/property	81.3 % (312)	9.4% (36)	9.4% (36)	1.281		
Marry/Being married	90.4 % (347)	5.7% (22)	3.9% (15)	1.135		
Employ/Being employed	96.6 % (371)	2.1% (8)	1.3% (5)	1.047		
Two Sample T-Test						
	Male	Female	T	df	Sig.	M.D
Seek Help/Helping	1.025	1.048	-.956	382	.339	-.0231
Purchase land/property	1.283	1.280	.051	382	.959	.0033
Marry/Being married	1.146	1.124	.504	382	.614	.0228
Employ/Being employed	1.076	1.016	2.204	382	.028	.0596

Source: Field data (2019)

Majority, 97.4% (374) of the sampled household respondents affirmed that they can seek help or help someone outside their social class, 1.6% (6) said that they cannot seek help or help someone outside their social class and 1% (4) were not sure. A mean of 1.036 postulates that majority of the respondents confirmed that they can seek help or help someone outside their social class. There was no significant (p=0.339) difference between the genders in regard to seeking help or helping someone outside the respondent's social class. This implies that both men and women can seek help or help a person outside their social class.

The findings also showed that majority, 81.3% (312) of the respondents indicated that they could purchase land or property outside their social class, 9.4% (36) could not purchase land or property from someone outside their social class and 9.4% (36) were not sure. A mean of 1.281 suggests that most of the respondents affirmed that they can purchase land/property someone outside their social class.

There was no significant (p=0.959) difference between the genders in regard to purchase of land or property outside one's social class.

Majority, 90.4% (347) of the sampled household respondents said could marry or be married by someone outside their social class, 5.7% (22) said they cannot marry or be married by someone outside their social class and 3.9% (15) were not sure. A mean of 1.135 indicates that most of the respondents could marry or be married someone outside their social class. The results indicated that there was no significant (p=0.614) difference between the genders in regard to marrying outside one's social class.

The results also revealed that majority, 96.6% (371) of the respondents could be employed or employ someone outside their social class, 2.1% (8) said they could not employ or be employed by someone outside their social class and 1.3% (5) were not sure. A mean of 1.047 postulates that majority of the respondents confirmed that they could employ or be employed by someone outside their social class. On the comparison between men and women, the results revealed that there was significant difference between the genders $t(382) = 2.204, p=0.028$ on employing or being employed by someone outside their social class. This implies that men (M=1.076) were more likely to be employed or employ someone outside their social class as compared to women respondents (M=1.016).

These finding contrast those of King'oro and Gitire (2018), who found out that only 14 % of people in different socio-economic statuses could get along well compared to 76% who did not. This means that social class had an implication on the way people relate. Elsewhere, Höglund and Piyarathne (2009) found out that socioeconomic class of individuals was an important variable in explaining the different types of violence experienced in Sri Lanka.

4.3.3. Political affiliation aspect of gender integration

The sampled household respondents were asked to indicate their opinion in regard to seeking help or helping, purchasing land and/or property, being married or marrying marriage and being employed or employing someone outside their political affiliation. The results are as shown in Table 4.8

4. 8: Political Affiliation Aspect of Gender Integration

N=384	Yes	No	Not Sure	Mean
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Seek Help/Help	78.4% (301)	12.8 % (49)	8.9% (34)	1.305		
Purchase land/property	31% (119)	57.6 % (221)	11.5% (44)	1.805		
Marry/Be married	41.7% (160)	41.4 % (159)	16.9% (65)	1.753		
Employ/Be employed	63.5% (244)	26.8 % (103)	9.6% (37)	1.461		
Two Sample T-Test						
	Male	Femal e	T	Df	Sig.	M.D
Seek Help/Help	1.273	1.339	- 1.035	382	.301	-.0660
Purchase land/property	1.818	1.790	.438	382	.662	.0279
Marry/Be married	1.758	1.747	.138	382	.890	.0103
Employ/Be employed	1.444	1.478	-.501	382	.617	-.0341

Source: Field data (2019)

Majority, 78.4% (301) of the sampled household respondents said they could seek help or help someone outside their political affiliation, 12.8% (49) said they cannot seek help or help someone outside their political affiliation and 8.9% (34) were not sure. A mean of 1.305 suggests that most of the respondents confirmed that they could seek help or help someone outside their political affiliation. On comparison between men and women, the results indicated that there was no significant (p=0.301) difference between the two genders in regard to helping or seeking help from someone outside one's political affiliation. In as much as majority of the respondents could seek help or be helped by someone outside their political affiliation, a significant number would not. This is a clear indication of how political affiliation strain gender relations among Kibera residents.

The results also revealed that 31% (119) of the sampled household respondents agreed that they could purchase land or property outside their political affiliation, 57.6% (221), could not purchase land or property from someone outside their political affiliation and 11.5% (44) were not sure. A mean of 1.805 implies that most of the respondents confirmed that they could not purchase land/property from someone outside their political affiliation. To establish the extent of gender integration in political affiliation, the findings revealed that there was no significant (p=0.662) difference between the genders in regard to purchasing of land or property from someone outside one's political affiliation. This suggests that both men and women were in agreement that they could not purchase land or property from a person outside their political affiliation.

These results reveal that Kenyans do not consider areas of a different political affiliation as a safe

place for serious investments such as land and property. Political affiliation has a negative impact on gender integration in purchasing land or property. Land and property are highly valued in Kenya and as a result, Kenyans tend to invest in these valued resources where they feel safe and certainly not in political opponents' space. The Waki report on Kenya's 2007/8 PEV noted that the violence was intense in the Rift Valley region whereby those viewed as settlers were driven out by indigenous people thus turning the violence into ethnic profiling. This can explain why Kenyans are skeptical about investing in regions outside their political affiliation.

The findings also revealed that 41.7% (160) of the sampled household respondents could marry or be married by someone outside their political affiliation, 41.4% (159) indicated they could not marry or be married by someone outside their political affiliation and 16.9% (65) were not sure. A mean of 1.753 indicates that most of the respondents confirmed could marry or be married to someone outside their political affiliation. On comparison between men and women, the results indicated that there was no significant (p=0.890) difference between the two genders in regard to marrying or being married to someone outside one's political affiliation. Comparing to purchasing land or property and marrying or being married to someone outside their political affiliation, Kibera residents were more integrated to the later.

A significant number 26.8% (103), said they could be employed or employ someone outside their political affiliation as shown by 63.5% (244) of the household respondents while of the sampled respondents felt that they could not employ or be employed by someone outside their political affiliation. On the other hand, 9.6% (37) of the sampled household were not sure if they could employ or be employed by someone outside their political affiliation. A mean of 1.461 implies that most of the respondents confirmed that they could employ or be employed by someone outside their political affiliation. On comparison between men and women, the results indicated that there was no significant (p=0.617) difference between the two genders in regard to employing or being employed by someone outside their political affiliation. These findings suggest that both men and women were indicated that they could employ or be employed by someone outside their political affiliation.

Results from FGDs were of the opinion that majority of the participants would seek help and/or

help, buy land and/or property, get married or marry and employ or be employed by someone outside their political affiliation. One of the participants said:

Why not. Of course, I can marry anyone from any political affiliation. Marriage is different. You love an individual person not a community. Yes, I would marry someone who is from Jubilee party affiliation even if am in ODM. But buying property outside my own political affiliation, I would have to be very sure they will not chase me. (FGD Participant in Kibera Location, 2019).

Most of the respondent had no problem marrying or being married by someone outside their political affiliation. They also had no problem buying land or property from someone outside their political affiliation so long as they were assured of their safety. However, a few respondents were not comfortable marrying someone outside their political affiliation or even buying land or property from someone outside their political affiliation.

According to Mlambo, Kapingura and Meissner (2019) full and equal participation of both women and men in political decision-making provides a balance that more accurately reflects the composition of society, and may as such enhance the legitimacy of gender integration by making them more democratic and responsive to the concerns and perspectives of all segments of society.

A growing number of studies also look at the gendered nature of political affiliation and argue that women’s experiences with politics are very different from those of men (Bellows & Jenderedjian, 2015). For example, male-oriented and non-gendered understandings of electoral violence often do not include sexist campaign rhetoric that is designed to intimidate and silence female candidates. This has resulted to negative attitude exhibited by female towards their male counterpart. It is difficult for women to sell a piece of land/properties to renowned politicians due to bully like tendencies.

4.3.4. Religious affiliation aspect of gender integration

The sampled household respondents were asked to indicate their opinion in regard to seeking help or helping, purchasing land and/or property, being married or marrying and being employed or

employing someone outside their religious affiliation. The results are as shown in Table 4.9

Table 4.9: Religious Affiliation Aspect of Gender Integration

N=384	Yes	No	Not Sure	Mean		
Seek Help/Help	96.9% (372)	2.9% (11)	0.3% (1)	1.034		
Purchase land/property	83.3% (320)	10.4% (40)	6.3% (24)	1.229		
Marry/Be married	82.6% (317)	11.7% (45)	5.7% (22)	1.232		
Employ/Be employed	96.6% (371)	2.6% (10)	0.8% (3)	1.042		
Two Sample T-Test						
	Male	Female	T	Df	Sig.	M.D
Seek Help/Help	1.040	1.027	.679	382	.498	.0135
Purchase land/property	1.212	1.247	-.626	382	.532	-.0352
Marry/Be married	1.242	1.220	.397	382	.691	.0220
Employ/Be employed	1.05	1.03	.757	382	.450	.018

Source: Field data (2019)

Overwhelming majority, 96.9% (372) of the sampled household respondents confirmed that they could seek help or help someone outside their religious affiliation, 2.9% (11) revealed they could not seek help or help someone outside their religious affiliation and 0.3% (1) were not sure. A mean of 1.034 implies that most of the respondents confirmed that they could seek help or help someone outside their religious affiliation. There was no significant (p=0.498) difference between the two genders in regard to seeking help or helping someone outside one’s religious affiliation. These findings suggest that both men and women could seek help or help someone outside their religious affiliation.

The results further revealed that majority, 83.3% (320) of the household respondents indicated that they could purchase land or property from someone outside their religious affiliation, 10.4% (40) could not and 6.3% (24) were not sure. A mean of 1.229 implies that most of the respondents confirmed that they could purchase land/property from someone outside their religious affiliation. There was no significant (p=0.532) difference between the two genders in regard to purchasing land or property from someone outside their religious affiliation. Likewise, majority 82.6% (317) of the sampled household respondents could marry or be married

by someone outside, 11.7% (45) could not and 5.7% (22) were not sure. A mean of 1.232 suggests that most of the respondents could marry or be married to someone outside their religious affiliation. On comparison between men and women, the findings revealed that there is no significant ($p=0.691$) difference between the two genders in regard to marrying or being married outside of their religious affiliation. T Majority, 96.6% (371) of the household respondents were in agreement that they could be employed or employ someone outside their religious affiliation, 2.6%(10) said they could not and 0.8 % (3) were not sure. A mean of 1.042 implies that most of the respondents confirmed that they could employ or be employed by someone outside their religious affiliation. The findings revealed that there was no significant ($p=0.450$) difference between the two men and women in regard to employing or being employed by someone outside one's religious affiliation.

In their study, Klingorova and Havlíček (2015), found out that religion significantly regulated the role of women and men in certain aspects of social and political life. Further Cox, Osborn and Sisk (2014), underscores the role that religion plays in social cohesion. Taking the Nigerian case, the scholars found out that religious affiliation had contributed to Nigeria's divisive politics compared to ethnicity since the 1990s. Further, psychological studies have shown that men and women have differences in how they perceive themselves. For example, Giligan's study on the theory of sex differences in the development of moral reasoning postulates that men and women perceive themselves differently (Muuss, 1988). Men are more likely to see themselves in terms of autonomy, freedom, independence and separate whereas women will see themselves first and foremost as being connected and responsive to each other.

4.4 Effects of Election Violence on Aspects of Gender Integration

The study further sought to establish the effects of election violence on various aspects of gender integration that is, seeking help/helping, purchasing land/property, marrying/being married and employing/being employed outside the respondents' ethnic affiliation, social class, political affiliation and religious affiliation aspects. Election violence was measured in terms of four natures, that is, social, economic, physical and psycho-emotional. In addition, the study conducted regression analysis so as to establish the effect that election violence had

on all these aspects of gender integration. The purpose of the regression analysis was to establish the magnitude of election violence using R square on various aspects of gender integration.

4.4.1 Effects of election violence on ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration

The study sought to establish the effects of election violence on ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration in terms of seeking help or helping, buying land or property, marrying or being married and employing or being employed by someone outside the respondent's ethnic affiliation.

4.4.1.1 Findings from spearman's rank order correlation coefficient

Spearman's Rank order (ρ) correlation was carried out to find the relationship between election violence and ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration. The results were as shown in Table 4.10

Table 4.10: Correlation between Election Violence and Ethnic Affiliation Aspect of Gender integration

	Social	Economical	Physical
Coefficient	-.645	-.065	-.110
Sig.	.000	.204	.032
N	384	384	384

Source: Field data (2019)

Data in Table 4.10 above shows that election violence had an effect on ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration. The results revealed that ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration had negative and significant relationship with social nature of election violence ($r = -0.645$, $p=0.000$), economic nature of election violence ($r = -0.065$), physical nature of election violence ($r = -0.110$, $p=0.032$) and psycho-emotional nature of election violence ($r = -0.076$, $p=, 138$). Only social and physical extent of election violence had significant negative effect on ethnic aspect of gender integration. This implies that increase in social and physical extents of election violence such as loss of lives, displacement, rape, separation of families, ethnic animosity, physical injuries and disability would result to decrease in ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration.

4.4.1.2 Contribution of Election violence to ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration

Multiple linear regression analysis was further carried out on the data collected to establish the contribution of the election violence to ethnic affiliation aspect of gender integration. The results were presented in Table 4.11 below.

Table 4.11: Contribution of Election Violence to Ethnic Affiliation Aspect of Gender Integration

	R-Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error	Df	F Ratio	Sig Level
Seek help/Help	.335	.315	.6105	4,383	21.715	.013
Purchase land/Property	.025	.004	2.3831	4,383	.491	.743
Marry/Be married	.223	.202	.7793	4,383	11.199	.043
Employ/Be employed	.048	.028	.9572	4,383	.775	.542

Source: Field data (2019)

Election violence in Kibera slum accounted for 33.5% (R Square = 0.335) of the variation in seeking help or helping someone outside the respondent’s ethnic affiliation. The results also indicated that election violence accounted for 2.5% (R Square = 0.025) of the variation in purchasing land or property from someone outside the respondent’s ethnic affiliation. This contribution was insignificant implying that individuals in Kibera slum could purchase land/property from someone outside their ethnic affiliation.

The results also revealed that election violence in Kibera slum accounted for 22.3% (R Square = 0.223) of the variation in marrying or being married by a someone outside the respondent’s ethnic affiliation. Thus, election violence was an insignificant contributor to being employed or employing someone outside the respondent’s ethnic affiliation. This means that election violence accounted for 4.8% (R Square = 0.048) of the variation in employing or being employed by someone outside the respondent’s ethnic affiliation.

4.4.2 Effects of election violence on social class Aspect of Gender Integration

The study sought to examine the effect of election violence on social class aspect of gender integration in terms of seeking help/helping, purchasing land/property, marrying/being married and employ/being employed by someone outside the respondents’ social class.

4.4.2.1 Findings from spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient

Spearman's Rank order (rho) correlation was carried to find the relationship between election violence and social class aspect of gender integration in

Kibera slum by social class aspect. The results were as shown in Table 4.12.

Table 4. 12: Correlation Between Election Violence and Social Class Aspect of Gender integration

	Social	Economical	Physical
Coefficient	-.554	-.066	-.126
Sig.	.000	.198	.013
N	384	384	384

Source: Field data (2019)

Election violence had an effect on social class aspect of gender integration. Gender integration in this case, seeking help helping, marrying/ being marries, buying land/property or employing/ being employed by someone outside one’s social class had negative relationship with social nature of election violence (r = -0.554), economic nature of election violence (r = -0.066), physical nature of election violence (r = -0.126) and psycho-emotional nature of election violence (r = -0.059). Of the four natures of election violence in this study, only two had significant negative effect on social class aspect of gender integration. The significance level was less than 0.05. This implies that increase in social and physical natures of election violence such as loss of lives, displacement, rape, separation of families and ethnic animosity, physical injuries and disability would result to decrease in the social class aspect of gender integration.

4.4.2.2 Contribution of election violence to social class aspect of gender integration

Multiple linear regression analysis was further carried out to establish the contribution of the election violence to social class aspect of gender integration. The results were presented in Table 4.13.

Table 4.13: Contribution of Election Violence to Social Class Aspect of Gender Integration

	R-Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error	Df	F Ratio	Sig Level
Seek help/Help	.250	.223	.312	4,383	32.189	.020
Purchase land/Property	.015	.005	.864	4,383	1.475	.209
Marry/Be married	.356	.324	.214	4,383	42.357	.013
Employ/Be employed	.024	.014	1.775	4,383	1.070	.371

Source: Field data (2019)

Election violence in Kibera slum explained up to 25.0% (R Square = 0.250) of the variation in

seeking help or helping someone outside one’s social class. Since the F value is greater than zero and $P < 0.05$ ($F(4,383) = 32.189, p = 0.020$), election violence was found to significantly predict gender integration in regard to seeking help or helping someone outside the respondent’s social class. On the other hand, election violence explained up to 1.5% ($R\text{ Square} = 0.015$) of the variation in purchasing land or property from someone outside the respondent’s social class. This contribution was insignificant implying that individuals in Kibera slum can purchase land/property from someone outside their social class.

The results further revealed that election violence in Kibera slum explained up to 35.6% ($R\text{ Square} = 0.356$) of the variation in marrying or being married by someone outside the respondent’s social class. Since the F value is greater than zero and $P < 0.05$ ($F(4,383) = 42.357, p < 0.05$), election violence was found to be a significant predictor of the social class aspect of gender integration. Lastly, election violence was an insignificant contributor to variation of being employed or employing someone outside the respondent’s social class as shown by $P = 0.371$. This implies that the presence of election violence would not deter one to employ or be employed by someone outside their social class.

These findings are in agreement with those of National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) report (2014) on future expectations of the relationships between Kenya’s social groups. Approximately, 74% of the respondents did not expect discrimination based on the ethnic identity, 78.2% based on socio-economic status and 85.2% based on their religious affiliation.

4.4.3 Effects of election violence on political affiliation aspect of gender integration

The study sought to establish from the respondents the effect of election violence on political affiliation aspect of gender integration (Seek Help/Help, Purchase land/property, Marry/Be married and Employ/Be employed from someone outside the respondent’s political affiliation). The findings are as discussed below.

4.4.3.1 Findings from spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient

Spearman's Rank order (ρ) correlation was carried to find the relationship between election violence and political affiliation aspect of gender integration. The results were as shown in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14: Correlation Between Election Violence and Political Affiliation Aspect of Gender integration

	Social	Economical	Physical
Coefficient	-.337	-.080	-.076
Sig.	.000	.116	.137
N	384	384	384

Source: Field data (2019)

Election violence had an effect on political affiliation aspect of gender integration. Political affiliation aspect of gender integration in this case, seeking help helping, marrying/ being marries, buying land/property or employing/ being employed by someone outside one’s political affiliation had a negative relationship with social nature of election violence ($r = -0.337$), economic nature of election violence ($r = -0.080$), physical nature of election violence ($r = -0.076$) and psycho-emotional nature of election violence ($r = -0.146$). Social nature and psycho-emotional nature of election violence had a significant relationship with political affiliation aspect of gender integration as their significance level was less than 0.05. This implies that increase in social and psycho-emotional nature of election violence would results to decrease in political affiliation aspect of gender integration.

4.4.3.2 Contribution of election violence to political affiliation aspect of gender integration

Multiple linear regression analysis was further carried out to establish the contribution of the election violence in explaining variation in political affiliation aspect of gender integration. The results were presented in Table 4.15.

Table 4.15: Contribution of Election Violence to Political Affiliation Aspect of Gender Integration

	R-Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error	Df	F Ratio	Sig Level
Seek help/Help	.008	-.002	.786	4,383	0.773	.543
Purchase land/Property	.013	.003	.625	4,383	1.286	.275
Marry/Be married	.152	.142	.766	4,383	15.223	.000
Employ/Be employed	.020	.009	.762	4,383	1.909	.108

Source: Field data (2019)

Election violence in Kibera slum explained up to 0.8% ($R\text{ Square} = 0.008$) of the variation in seeking help or helping someone outside one’s political

affiliation. This variation was insignificant implying that individuals in Kibera slum can seek help or help someone outside their political affiliation. Similarly, election violence insignificantly contributed to gender integration in regard to purchasing land or property as indicated by $p=0.275$. It insignificantly explained up to 1.3% (R Square = 0.013) of the variation in purchasing land or property from someone outside one's political affiliation.

Election violence was also an insignificant contributor to variation of being employed or employing someone outside one's political affiliation as shown by $p=0.108$. This implies that presence of election violence would not deter one to employ or be employed by someone outside one's political affiliation. Lastly, election violence in Kibera slum explained up to 15.2% (R Square = 0.152) of the variation in marrying or being married by someone outside one's political affiliation. Since the $P < 0.05$ and F value is greater than zero $F(4,383) = 15.223$, $p < 0.05$, election violence was found to be a significant predictor of gender integration in regard to marrying or being married to someone outside one's political affiliation.

These findings are supported by those of Ahere (2018), who although not very explicit on the contribution of election violence to gender integration, notes that political parties were the weakest link to peace and social cohesion in both Kenya and South Africa.

4.4.4 Effects of election violence on religious affiliation aspect gender integration

The study sought to find out the effect of election violence on gender integration in terms of seeking help/helping, purchase land/property, marrying/being married and employing/being employed from outside outside one's religious affiliation.

4.4.4.1 Findings from spearman's rank order correlation coefficient

Spearman's Rank order (ρ) correlation was undertaken to find out the relationship between election violence and religious affiliation aspect of gender integration. The results were as shown in Table 4.16.

Table 4.16: Correlation between Election Violence and Religious Aspect of Gender Integration

	Social	Economical	Physical
Coefficient	.336**	-.040	-.022
Sig.	.000	.433	.674
N	384	384	384

Source: Field data (2019)

Election violence had relationship with religious affiliation aspect of gender integration. Religious affiliation aspect of gender integration in this case, seeking help or being helped, marrying or being married, buying land or property or employing or being employed by someone outside one's religious affiliation had negative relationship with social nature of election violence ($r = -0.336$), economic nature of election violence ($r = -0.040$), physical nature of election violence ($r = -0.022$) and psycho-emotional nature of election violence ($r = -0.038$). Of the four natures of election violence in this study, only social nature of election violence had significant relationship with religious affiliation aspect of gender integration. This implies that increase in social nature of election violence would result to decrease in religious affiliation aspect of gender integration.

4.4.4.2 Contribution of election violence to religious affiliation aspect of gender integration

Multiple linear regression analysis was further carried out to establish the contribution of the election violence in explaining variation in religious affiliation aspect of gender integration. The results were presented in Table 4.17.

Table 4.17: Contribution of election violence on religious aspect of gender integration

	R-Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error	Df	F Ratio	Sig Level
Seek help/Helping	.012	.002	.195	4,383	1.197	.312
Purchase land/Property	.020	.010	.547	4,383	1.930	.105
Marry/Being married	.008	-.002	.542	4,383	0.776	.541
Employ/Being employed	.001	-.010	.237	4,383	0.081	.988

Source: Field data (2019)

Election violence in Kibera slum explained up to 1.2% (R Square = 0.012) of the variation in seeking help or helping someone outside one's religious

affiliation. This contribution was insignificant ($P > 0.05$) implying that residents of Kibera slum can seek help or help someone outside their religious affiliation during election violence. Similarly, election violence explained up to 2.0% (R Square = 0.020) of the variation in purchasing land or property from a person outside one's religious affiliation. This contribution was insignificant implying that individuals in Kibera slum can purchase land/property from someone outside their religious affiliation.

The results further revealed that election violence in Kibera slum explained up to 0.8% (R Square = 0.008) of the variation in marrying or being married by someone outside one's religious affiliation. This variation is insignificant implying that one could marry or be married to someone outside one's religious affiliation during election violence. Lastly, election violence was an insignificant contributor to variation of being employed or employing someone outside one's religious affiliation as shown by $P = 0.998$. This implies that the presence of election violence would not deter one to employ or be employed by someone outside one's religious affiliation.

These findings are in agreement with those of National Cohesion and Integration Commission NCIC) report (2014) on future expectations of the relationships between Kenya's social groups. Approximately, 74% of the respondents did not expect discrimination based on the ethnic identity, 78.2% based on socio-economic status and 85.2% based on their religious affiliation.

6.0 Conclusion Of The Study

The study established that the relationship that Kibera residents had with each other was moderately cordial. However, there was significant difference between men and women in regard to their relationship with residents of Kibera slum. Women had more moderate cordial relationships with the other residents of Kibera slum as compared to men. Election violence was a predictor of gender integration. Nevertheless, election violence had a negative relationship with ethnic affiliations, social class, political affiliation and religious affiliation aspects of gender integration. This means an increase in election violence would lead to a decrease in gender integration.

7.0 Recommendation Of The Study

The study established that election violence had a negative influence on gender integration and

therefore recommends that NGOs, CBOs and FBOs enhance their non-partisan advocacy on peaceful coexistence among men and women of different communities and carry out civic education to enlighten people on the importance of gender integration especially during the electioneering period.

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